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International law has developed both in significance and degree.1 The
progressive globalization of the world system, however, raises a perti-
nent question regarding the relevance of international law. In spite of the
denigration towards the effectiveness of international law and the chal-
lenges of its enforcement,2 there exists a conviction that international law
counts. This conviction inspires the work of international scholars and
lawyers who deliberate on how to make international law more effec-
tive.3 Notably, the complexities of the world’s problems, and in some
cases its interconnection, make it practically impossible for nation states
to single handedly attend to such problems when they arise. Hence, inter-
national law becomes a likely solution to those challenges which tran-
scend the orbit and competence of individual nation states.
* MPhil/Ph.D. Candidate, University of Central Lancashire, Lancashire Law School, U.K.,
with current work on legal conceptions of national security relevant to counter-terrorism and human
rights law and policy; LL.M., International Business Law, University of Central Lancashire,
Lancashire Law School, U.K.; B.L., Nigerian Law School; LL.B. (Hons.), Imo State University,
Nigeria; Barrister & Solicitor at Law, Supreme Court of Nigeria; Former Associate Law Lecturer,
University of Central Lancashire, Lancashire Law School, U.K.
1. C. Bradley et al., Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. (1997).
2. D. Adia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protect-
ing the Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. (1998).
3. A. Chayes et al., On Compliance, 4 INT’L ORG. 175-207 (1993).
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International terrorism and human rights are at a crossroads. After 9/11,
counterterrorism measures have tested the tension that exists between
these two areas. International law is not an illusion. Nevertheless, it is a
primordial system with obvious limitations on its effectiveness. Although
it is a principal medium of developing solutions, it cannot, on its own,
solve the world’s problems. Therefore, the effectiveness of international
law in regulating the conduct of nation states and other international ac-
tors in practical circumstances has been questioned by many. The puzzle
surrounding the effectiveness of international law is propagated on the
practice of states, groups and individuals to engage in internationally un-
lawful actions without any checks on their conduct by the international
legal system. Such unlawful conduct includes the detention of terrorist
suspects without trial, the use of torture in the ‘war against terror,’ the
United States led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the unhindered re-
sort to indiscriminate violence against civilians by groups based in ex-
isting states (with or without the support of another states government)
and the denial of procedural and substantive rights to those being de-
tained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay.4 These unlawful actions
constitute grave human rights violations under international law. As a
result, international law is perceived as a failure in one of its principal
purposes of maintaining an orderly society where the weak are shielded
from the arbitrary actions of the strong.5
The right not to be tortured is a universal right governed by international
human rights law. As such, the question becomes: how effective is the
international human rights law in deterring extraterritorial state conduct?
How relevant is it in prescribing the behavior of state entities that do not
exercise or aspire to adhere to its principles? The flagrant violations of
human rights laws, such as Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR),6 sparks serious concerns about the efficacy of
international law. One begins to wonder if international law excuses
some nation states from complying with its rules and principles irrespec-
tive of the fact that those nation states are signatories to treaties and con-
ventions that oblige them to uphold those rules and principles.
Considering most of the counterterrorism measures, policies and legisla-
tions that have been passed by nation states since 9/11, the question as to
the ‘force’ of international law becomes a matter of grave concern.
4. M. DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., Oxford Publishing Press Ltd.
2013).
5. Id.
6. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (formerly titled
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [hereinafter
ECHR].
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For instance, the United Kingdom responded to the war against terror by
enacting the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. The Act cur-
tails some civil liberties of alien non-nationals suspected of terrorism.7
Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, for example, allows
the Home Secretary to certify any non-British national whom he suspects
to be a terrorist and detain them ‘indefinitely’ pending deportation, even
when such a deportation would be prohibited.8 As discussed under Sec-
tion 23 of the Act, a suspected international terrorist must be detained
irrespective of the fact that his removal or departure from the United
Kingdom is prevented by international law. More extensive legislation
was enacted by the Australian government. Under the Australia Security
Intelligence Organization (ASIO) Security Legislation Amendment (Ter-
rorism) Act 2002, non-suspects can be detained merely for the purposes
of questioning and intelligence gathering, which is incompatible with
Australia’s legal commitment under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights9 (ICCPR).10 Yet, it could have been more reasona-
ble, assuming detention for questioning is essential, for such detention to
be confined to persons who are reasonably suspected of being terrorists
or who are involved in terrorist activities.11 One of the most alarming
sections of the ASIO Act is s.34NA, which permits the detention of chil-
dren between the ages of sixteen to eighteen for the purpose of question-
ing if it is likely that such a child will commit, is committing or has
committed a terrorist offense. This contravenes Article 37 of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which Australia is a party.12
Legally speaking, a child is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven.13 The enactment of some of these measures plunge human rights
protection into a dilemma. The implementation of these types of
counterterrorism legislation facilitates the offense of torture and ill, de-
grading and inhuman treatment, which is an aberration under interna-
tional human rights law.
7. V. Henning, Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made
a Valid Derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1263-97 (2002).
8. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
10. C. Michaelsen, Derogating from International Human Rights Obligations in the ‘War
Against Terrorism’? A British-Australian Perspective, 17 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 131-155
(2005).
11. Id.
12. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
13. Michaelsen, supra note 10.
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Terrorism invokes very compelling emotional responses, which often
lead to morally conflicting decisions. Thus, nation states ought to align
their counterterrorism measures with the principles of the rule of law.
The fact that sovereign states are at liberty to enact counterterrorism
measures that are in consonance with their particular national interests
does not preclude them from complying with their obligations under in-
ternational law, including the basic responsibility of protecting the rights
of all individuals, devoid of discrimination of any kind.14 States have
continually overstepped the limits of permissible actions in their
counterterrorism measures or legislation. The enduring threat of terror-
ism, coupled with an enduring need for well-articulated anti-terrorism
legislation, has been sustained as a pragmatic prospect for nation states.15
This paper sets out to address the following question: to what extent has
international law effectively curtailed the practice of torture in a demo-
cratic society within the context of the ‘war against terror’? This paper
will first provide an overview of the current regime of international law
prohibiting torture. Next, this paper will discuss the absolute ban on tor-
ture and violations that have occurred in the name of the ‘war against
terror.’ This paper will then address the consequences of the use of tor-
ture as a counterterrorism measure. Finally, this paper will critically ana-
lyze the effectiveness of international law on addressing torture. This
paper will ultimately conclude on the topic and offer recommendations.
II. THE CASE OF TORTURE
In current counterterrorism rhetoric, terrorism is pictured as a danger of
massive magnitude.16 It threatens not only our lives, but “our way of
lives” and “civilisation to the extent that”17 it is perceived as a threat so
great that any existing international norms seem inadequate. After the
Madrid train bombings, British Home Secretary David Blunkett stated
that “. . .the norms of prosecution and punishment no longer apply.”18 It
is in this frame of mind that the U.S., in its efforts to combat terrorism,
held more than 700 detainees at Guantanamo in 2002 and continued to
14. C. Lumina, Counterterrorism Legislation and the Protection of Human Rights: A Survey of
Selected International Practice, 7 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 35-67 (2007).
15. C. Walker, The Reshaping of Control Orders in the United Kingdom: Time for a Fairer
Go, Australia!, 37 MELB. U. L. REV. 143-88 (2013).
16. J. Wolfendale, Terrorism, Security and the Threat of Counterterrorism, 30 STUDIES IN
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hold approximately 400 as of 2007.19 Most of the detainees were incar-
cerated for over four years and were precluded from protections of any
legal framework, such as the Geneva Convention.20 As Ronald Dworkin
observed in “The Threat to Patriotism,” there is a tendency to think that
the gravity of terrorist acts is a reason in and of itself to erode the legal
protections of suspected terrorists.21 Following this reasoning, in times of
crisis nations resort to torture as a tool to gain immediate intelligence and
counteract terrorist threats. Despite these justifications, the spirit of inter-
national law maintained a complete ban on torture. International conven-
tions, such as the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment22 (UNCAT) and
the European Convention on Human Rights state that torture and any
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is against
international human rights law.
Although it persists in the contemporary world, torture is universally
condemned as barbaric and ineffective under international law.23
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, Article 5 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Peoples’ Rights (UDHR) states: “No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”24 Following this, in 1966 the U.N. opened for signature the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, now ratified by 165
countries.25 Article 7 of the ICCPR states: ‘‘No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. . ..’’26
Effective in 1987, the U.N. also specifically addressed torture in the Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (UNCAT), which has been ratified by 146
countries.27 The UNCAT requires states to take affirmative steps to pre-
vent torture.28 At a regional level, the Council of Europe, with 47 mem-
ber states as of now, opened the ECHR for signature in 1951. Taking a
cue from the UDHR, Article 3 of the ECHR states: “No one shall be
19. J. Hafetz, Torture, Judicial Review and the Regulation of Custodial Interrogations, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433 (2007).
20. Id.
21. Wolfendale, supra note 16.
22. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter UNCAT].
23. P. Miller, Torture Approval in Comparative Perspective, 12 HUM. RTS. REV. 441 (2011).
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
25. ICCPR, supra note 9.
26. Id. art. 7.
27. UNCAT, supra note 22.
28. Id.
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subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”29
The Council of Europe went even further in its fight against the use of
torture when, in 1987, it opened for signature the European Convention
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, which solely focused on the issue of torture.30
A. DEFINITION OF TORTURE
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is the most comprehensive
body of law on torture and provides the most complete and recognized
definition of torture. Under Article 1, “torture” is generally defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person  for. . .obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punish-
ing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind. . .by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.31
While the offense of torture basically involves government officials or
agents who obtain information from ‘suspects’ or ‘accused’ persons
forcefully, for an act to constitute torture, as defined under Article 1 of
the UNCAT, it must possess some significant elements. The first ele-
ment, under Article 1(a), requires severe mental or physical suffering or
pain must be inflicted on the ‘accused’ or the ‘suspect.’32 Of note, acts of
torture are not always physical, but also include the infliction of mental
pain or suffering. Case law has reiterated this principle of the UNCAT.
In Sanian v. Lithuania,33 the court stated that “Article 3 does not refer
exclusively to the infliction of physical pain but also of mental suffering,
which is caused by creating a state of anguish and stress by means other
than bodily assault.”34 Further, torture must be inflicted by a public offi-
29. ECHR, supra note 6, art. 3.
30. I. Turner, Freedom From Torture in the “War Against Terror”: Is It Absolute?, 23 TER-
RORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 419-37 (2011).
31. UNCAT, supra note 22.
32. Id. art. 1(a).
33. Sanian v. Lithuania, App. No. 32293/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
34. Id. ¶ 47.
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cial or a government agent who deliberately inflicts the pain in order to
obtain information or a confession.35 Notably, the judgement of a judicial
authority cannot constitute torture. The person tortured may be a suspect
or may be tortured on behalf of a third person, but cannot be the culprit.36
The basis for torture may also include discrimination.37 Torture can also
take the form of intimidation and coercion.38
The pain and suffering, whether mental or physical, must rise to the level
of ‘severe’ in order to constitute torture. Case law offers guidance as to
when pain and suffering is sufficiently ‘severe.’ In Aksoy v. Turkey,39 the
detainee, amongst other things, was subjected to a ‘Palestinian hanging,’
in which his hands were tied to his back and he was strung up by his
arms. As a result, the detainee suffered severe pain at the time of the
hanging, and, thereafter, suffered from paralysis of both arms.40 The Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found such treatment to be ‘se-
vere’ and ‘cruel.’41 The ECtHR considered the Palestinian hanging to be
‘torture’ since it was deliberately inflicted with a certain degree of prepa-
ration and exertion required to carry it out.42 The ECtHR held that such
treatment could only be intentional with the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation or admissions from the detainee.43 The court in Ireland v. United
Kingdom44 similarly held that torture involved a certain ‘intensity’ and
‘cruelty,’ attaching a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment
causing very ‘serious’ and ‘cruel’ suffering.45 In that case, Northern Ire-
land authorities systematically applied the “five techniques,” including
wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep and dep-
rivation of food.  However, the court found that those techniques did not
constitute torture as contemplated under Article 3 of the ECHR.46 Ac-
cordingly, for an act to constitute torture, ‘severity’ and ‘cruelty’ must be
one of its defining elements.
According to the Bybee memo, the severity of the pain is such that it is





39. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1997).




44. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978).
45. Id. ¶ 167.
46. Id.
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or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will
likely result.47 The memo added that severe mental pain not only re-
quired suffering at the moment of infliction, but also lasting psychologi-
cal harm, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or another mental
disorder. Thus, the severity of the mental or physical pain that constitutes
torture is of higher degree than the pain emanating from a cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.48
The second element, under Article 1(b) of the UNCAT, requires the act
to be intentional. An inadvertent act does not qualify for this element
even if such an act culminates into ‘severe’ pain or suffering. Pain or
suffering only arising from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions,
such as detention facilities, does not amount to torture.49 The crime of
torture warrants a specific intent as opposed to general or basic intent.
The reasoning for this higher standard of intent is explained in D.P.P. v.
Morgan, where Lord Simon noted that in crimes of basic intent, the mens
rea does not go beyond the actus reus.50 Therefore, in order for an act to
be intentional, the accused must not only intend to inflict pain or suffer-
ing, but must do so for a purpose prohibited by the UNCAT.51
The third element, under Article 1(c), requires the purpose of the act to
be for obtaining information or a confession.52 In the absence of this
element, it is immaterial whether the mental and physical pain suffered is
‘severe.’ In effect, it is the purpose of such act that will determine
whether the severity of the pain to be inflicted for the act amounts to
torture. Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can also cause severe
pain and suffering, but the distinguishing element between it and torture
is the purpose behind the act. For example, in Keenan v. United King-
dom, the ECtHR pointed out that it is the purposive element of torture,
the intent that motivates the conduct, which basically differentiates it
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and not the severity of the
treatment itself.53
The last element, under Article 1(d), requires the pain or suffering to be
inflicted by someone acting in an official capacity, such as a public offi-
47. C. De Vos, Mind the Gap: Purpose, Pain, and the Difference Between Torture and Inhu-
man Treatment, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 4-10 (2007).
48. Id.
49. Oona Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture Under International and
Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791 (2012).
50. D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) 216-17.
51. Id.
52. UNCAT, supra note 22, art. 1(c).
53. Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38 (2001).
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cial or on their behalf.54 The crime of torture is, therefore, being commit-
ted by the state through its agents. A typical torturer will be a law
enforcement officer or a member of a security or intelligence service,
specifically seeking to obtain, in the course of or in furtherance of his
duties, information or confessions.55 Pursuant to the UNCAT description
of a perpetrator, any official who instigates, consents or acquiesces in
torture qualifies as a torturer. However, there is a tendency for a direct
perpetrator of the torture to act in collusion with and to advance the in-
tentions of a civilian political authority that might be indifferent to the
excesses of the law enforcement or security officials.56 A perpetrator is,
thus, not limited to the official who directly inflicts the torture. It may
also be a person without official status, acting in collusion with and to
advance the purposes of public officialdom, usually in order to cloak the
duties of the members of that officialdom. In sum, a public official has to
either directly or indirectly be the perpetrator of torture in order for the
act to constitute torture under the UNCAT and trigger a violation of the
right to be free from torture.
B. ABSOLUTE BAN ON TORTURE
Torture is characterized as a ‘heinous crime’ which threatens ‘civilized
values’ and transcends borders.57 Since the 19th century, torture has been
considered “the supreme enemy of humanitarian jurisprudence and of
liberalism and the greatest threat to law and reason” by Western socie-
ties.58 As a consequence, unlike other rights and protections that may be
curtailed, the prohibition on torture is absolute under major international
conventions addressing human rights and humanitarian law.59 For in-
stance, Article 3 of the ECHR provides that “no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”60 The ab-
solute ban is deemed universal and has become part of customary inter-
national law.61 Torture is generally characterized as a violation of both
54. UNCAT, supra note 22, art. 1(d).
55. N. RODLEY, THE DEFINITIONS OF TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 467-93 (Oxford Univ.
Press. 2002).
56. J. BURGERS ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK
ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT 119-20 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988).
57. M. GOODALE, HUMAN RIGHTS AT CROSSROADS 87 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
58. O. Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedi-
ence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481-1551 (2004).
59. J. LOKANNETA, TRANSNATIONAL TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE AND STATE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES AND INDIA (N.Y. Univ. Press 2011).
60. ECHR, supra note 6, art. 3.
61. Gross, supra note 58.
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international law and jus cogent norms.62 In spite of this absolute prohi-
bition on torture, there are revelations that law enforcement agents or
military personnel apply excessive force while interrogating suspects.
When these revelations come to light, governments often reassure the
public that such actions are not reflective of any general policy. Never-
theless, the 9/11 incident and the war on terrorism opened a new chapter
in the story of torture.63 Beginning with the development under the Bush
Administration of an unprecedented detention system tailored to operate
outside any established legal framework,64 governments increasingly
confront terrorism with tools of torture.
The offense of torture is perpetrated through diverse mechanisms. These
unlawful and counterproductive practices especially prevail in law en-
forcement organisations charged with fighting terrorism.65  The system-
atic torture and cruelty terrorist suspects are subjected to include water
boarding, extended sleep deprivation, forced nudity and physical abuse,
such as slamming suspects into walls and forcing them into painful and
stressful positions for hours at a time.66 One notable case of torture is the
treatment of the applicant in El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia.67 In that case, the applicant was subjected to degrading
treatments before he was handed over to the CIA rendition team at
Skopje airport. For instance, amongst other things, he was blindfolded,
handcuffed and sodomized (a suppository was forced into his anus).68
During his flight to Afghanistan, two injections and an anaesthetic were
administered over his nose. These practices contravene the second arm of
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which provides that “. . .no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”69 The forceful in-
sertion of an object into the applicant’s anus can be described as a ‘de-
grading treatment.’ The facts of the present case reveal that the
interrogation by the respondent’s government agent was accompanied by
threats, insults, pushing and shouting.70 These practices are contrary to
62. J. Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism and International Law, 67 ALBANY L.
REV. 335-70 (2004).
63. Gross, supra note 58.
64. Hafetz, supra note 19.
65. L. Shetret et al., Promoting Organizational Change to Ensure Respect for Human Rights
While Countering Terrorism (Ctr. on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Policy Brief 2012).
66. D. Cole, Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and Individual Lies After 9/11, 57 WAYNE L.
REV. 1203-67 (2012).
67. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
68. Id.
69. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 7.
70. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
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the provisions of Article 16 of the UNCAT obliging nation states to en-
sure that cruel, ill or degrading treatment is prevented within their
jurisdiction.
In ensuring the prevention of torture, international law not only makes it
incumbent on states to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial
or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory within its
jurisdiction, under Article 2 of the UNCAT,71 but imposes additional ob-
ligations on states. States are further required to prevent individuals
within their custody from being subjected to torturous treatment in the
jurisdiction of another state. By virtue of Article 3 of the UNCAT, state
parties are prohibited from expelling, returning or extraditing a person to
another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.72 If it is expedient that a
suspect or an accused person must be returned to his country or a third
country where there is a likelihood of torture, the contracting country
must, of necessity, obtain a diplomatic assurance from the returning
country.73 In international law, this rule is referred to as the principle of
“non-refoulement.”74
The principle of non-refoulement is supported by the U.N. and the juris-
prudence of the ECHR. In Chahal v. United Kingdom, an applicant of
Indian origin who was arrested in the U.K. for political activity and crim-
inal investigations claimed that his deportation to India would violate
Article 3 of the ECHR because there was a high risk of torture if he were
returned to India.75 The ECtHR found the deportation to be a violation of
Article 3.76 It held that the guarantee under Article 3 was absolute and
the U.K. could not justify the deportation on national security given the
risk of torture that the applicant would face in India.77 The U.N. further
reiterated this principle in the 2002 U.N. General Assembly Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Question
of  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
71. UNCAT, supra note 22, art. 2.
72. Id. art. 3.
73. Under UNCAT, art. 3(a), States are obliged to take an affirmative step to obtain a diplo-
matic assurance where there is a likelihood of torture or ill or degrading treatment in another
jurisdiction.
74. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The Principle of Non-refoulment as a
Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in cases 2 BVR 1938/93, 2 BVR 1953/93, 2
BVR 1954/93, (1994), http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64html.
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ment, maintaining that states must not surrender persons intended for
extradition under terrorist or other charges unless the government of the
receiving country has provided an unequivocal guarantee that the right of
the persons concerned, under Article 3 of the ECHR, will not be vio-
lated.78 On the other end, the receiving country must also put an effective
monitoring system in place to ensure that the personal dignity of the per-
sons concerned is respected.79
Should a case of torture arise, international law imposes an additional
duty on states to ensure that an ‘effective’ and ‘independent’ investiga-
tion is carried out whenever there is an allegation of ‘torture’ or ‘ill’ or
‘degrading treatment’ from an ‘accused’ or a ‘suspect.’80 These mea-
sures, however, are not consistently employed by states. For example, in
El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the respon-
dent government never demonstrated that it obtained such diplomatic as-
surance on behalf of the applicant.81 The respondent government also
never showed that any monitoring mechanism was put in place to ensure
the protection of the applicant’s personal dignity while in Afghanistan.82
Further, the government did not fulfil its duty to effectively investigate
the applicant’s claim as the facts of the case reveal that the internal in-
quiry set up within the Ministry of Interior to investigate the case never
even invited the applicant to produce any evidence nor was he informed
of the outcome of the inquiry. Impliedly, the facts upon which the in-
quiry acted on were one-sided. Serious allegations of ill or degrading
treatment should, ideally, presuppose rigorous investigation. The effec-
tiveness of the investigation must be measured by certain procedural
thresholds, such as fairness and transparency.
Despite the clear ban on torture and the principle of non-refoulement, in
the war against terrorism, states collaborate to commit torturous acts in
violation of international law. The International Law Commission has
acknowledged that internationally wrongful conduct often emanates from
the collaboration of two or more states as opposed to one state.83 Com-
plicity in torture by states or their agents is deemed unlawful under the
general principles of international law regarding state responsibility for
78. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on the Question of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/57/173 (Feb. 7, 2002).
79. Id.
80. UNCAT, supra note 22, art. 3(b).
81. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
82. Id.
83. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ALLEGATIONS OF UK COMPLICITY IN TORTURE,
2008-9, H.L., H.C. (U.K.).
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internationally wrongful acts. Article 16 of the U.N. Resolution 56/83,
adopted by the General Assembly in 2001, holds a state which aids or
assists another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act
internationally responsible for doing so.84 The occurrence of states acting
in complicity to bypass more stringent rules in their own jurisdictions
and commit torture is high. As seen in El-Masri’s case,85 for example,
the applicant was transferred from the respondent state to Afghanistan,
where his right not to be subjected to torture was violated. No doubt, the
event of 9/11 changed the way most nation states react towards the issue
of national security, especially in relation to international terrorism. The
fight against terrorism ignited a persistent, intentional erosion of funda-
mental rights by state actors. Nation states have connived to subject inno-
cent nationals to torture, which is an impermissible act under
international human rights law.
States act with complicity to commit torture through special government
administered programs, such as the high value detainee program (HVD
Program) adopted by the United States. The HVD Program, also known
as the rendition detention interrogation program (RDI Program), is in-
tended as a counterterrorism measure where suspected terrorists are sub-
jected to special interrogation (torture) and detention. One key feature of
this program is that the CIA is granted extended competences relating to
its clandestine actions, namely its authority to detain terrorist suspects
and to establish secret detention facilities outside the United States, in
collaboration with the governments of the concerned nations.86 These
practices were seen in Al-Nashiri v. Poland,87 where the applicant was
captured in Dubai and transferred to a secret CIA run detention facility in
Afghanistan called ‘Salt Pit.’ From there, the applicant was taken to an-
other secret CIA prison in Bangkok, code-named ‘Cat’s Eye,’ where he
was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.88
Another key feature of the HVD program is the use of black sites for the
commission of torture. Under the program, government agents represent-
ing one country detain terrorist suspects in another country, kidnap them
and then deliver them to a second country to be subjected to enhanced
interrogation techniques (torture). For this purpose, the CIA established
84. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
85. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
86. Al-Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
87. Id. ¶¶ 47, 48.
88. Id. ¶¶ 83-86.
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black sites that are operated in Cuba, the Middle East and Europe.89
Black sites include Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Bagram Air force Base
(Afghanistan) and Abu Ghraib (Iraq). This procedure is referred to as
extraordinary rendition, where terrorist suspects are detained from any
part of the world before they are turned over to the CIA agents, who
render the suspects to a black site where they will be subjected to the
complete control of United States government.90 This type of rendition is
problematic and distinct from ‘irregular rendition,’ even though irregular
rendition is also problematic as it evades internationally established
processes for acquiring control over non-citizens. The detainees are sub-
jected to three phases in the black sites.91 The first is the initial condition
phase, where they are photographed naked and evaluated. The second is
the transition to interrogation phase, where the interrogators try to ascer-
tain the detainees’ responsiveness towards the release of information. In
this phase, the degree of the detainees’ readiness to release information
catapults him to an intense level of interrogation. The third is the full
blown interrogation phase, where interrogators employ different kinds of
techniques to achieve their goals. Detainees are subjected to a variety of
physical and mental abuses during this phase, including white noise,
sleep deprivation, prolonged nakedness, displays of constant light during
interrogations, electric shock treatments, walling, slapping, threats of
sexual torture, wall standings and cramped confinement.92
C. CONSEQUENCES OF TORTURE
The offense of torture is ultimately not devoid of consequences. One
such consequence is that the use of torture to combat terrorism only per-
petuates a never-ending cycle of violence. When torture is committed by
democratic governments, in direct violation of their own vocalized prin-
ciples, the people of those states are held equally responsible with the
government and its actors. The constituents of those states committing
torture are put at a greater risk of becoming innocent victims of retalia-
tory terrorist acts.93 Terrorists go so far as to rationalize the targeting of
innocent bystanders on the basis of cruel acts that some have committed
against others. For example, the terrorist who detonated the Edgware
Road bombs on London’s underground trains on July 7, 2005 made the
89. K. Tucker, Abduction, Torture, Interrogation—Oh My! An Argument Against Extraordi-




93. W. STRITZKE ET AL., TERRORISM AND TORTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2013).
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following statement in rationalization of his actions: “Your democrati-
cally elected governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my
people all over the world. Your support of them makes you directly re-
sponsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging
my Muslim brothers and sisters.”94
The hypocrisy of using torture against terrorist suspects has the potency
of radicalising people who ordinarily are not connected to terrorism or
acts related to terrorism. In some instances, enemies who ab initio were
not there are created. The illegal methods used against terrorist suspects
can mistakenly help to justify the goals or ideology of the terrorist sus-
pect. Out of sympathy for their religious affiliation or ethnicity, some
innocent individuals answer the call to activities that use terrorism as
they witness or access information concerning the type of treatment (tor-
ture) their ‘brothers’ are subjected to as terrorists’ suspects. This compli-
cates the challenges caused by terrorism.
Another set of consequences stems from the inefficiency of torture as a
tool to combat terrorism. One consequence is the torture of innocent peo-
ple due to the overzealousness of torture programs to find suspects. This
can lead to interrogators receiving false information. If an innocent per-
son is being tortured as a terrorist suspect for the purpose of obtaining
information or a confession, his likely response might be to either remain
silent since he knows nothing about terrorism or to release false informa-
tion to his interrogator in order to bring the treatment (torture) on him to
an end. In the latter case, the falsity of the information is immaterial to
the innocent person as he wants the torture to end. There are additional
circumstances under which torture has produced false leads. For in-
stance, false information obtained from torture helped to justify the Iraq
War.95 A further consequence is that since the tool of torture is costly,
with unsuccessful results, it becomes a large waste of economic re-
sources. For example, U.S. officials and agents have wasted millions of
dollars and innumerable man hours chasing multiple false leads.96
The enforcement of the right not to be tortured is of such importance that
it cannot be overlooked by international humanitarian law. The degree to
which Article 3 of the ECHR (an equivalent of ICCPR Article 7) is fla-
grantly violated by nation states who are signatories to the Convention
raises an eyebrow about the efficacy of current international law gov-
erning the use and prevention of torture.
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III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TORTURE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Some authors argue that international law is principally a product of
states hunting for their own interest in the international terrain. Foreign
policy decisions, together with decisions to sign treaties and comply with
international law, are made based on the assessment of a state’s national
interests. Suggestively, international law has no life of its own, no special
normative authority. It is just the working out of relations among states,
as they deal with relatively discrete problems of international coopera-
tion.97 Hence, states see no justification for complying with treaties if
those treaties do not align with their current interests or as their interests
and powers change. It becomes a huge challenge for international law to
be effective when there are close to 200 states with independent interests,
agendas and ideologies.
The American military response to the Al-Qaeda threat raised serious
questions about international law. The national security interests of the
United States took a drastic turn post 9/11. The Bush Administration
reacted swiftly and resolutely with military force against any nation that
might harbor international terrorists who have the proficiency of threat-
ening U.S. security interests. Consequently, traditional legal limits on the
use of force had to make way for a new perception of national security98
in the war against terror.  Most nations of the world responded to both
domestic and international obligations after the 9/11 incident. On Sep-
tember 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
1373, which required states to “take necessary steps to prevent the com-
mission of terrorists’ acts.”99 Following this call to action, nations of the
world hastened to legislate. The United States enacted the U.S.A.
P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act on October 26, 2001, which stands for “Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”100 The United Kingdom enacted the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001. New Zealand enacted
the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and Australia enacted a variety of
measures galvanized into several various Acts.101 The enactment of these
97. J. GOLDSMITH ET AL., THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press
2005).
98. Id.
99. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
100. Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
archive/ll/highlights.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
101. G. William et al., Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing the Legal
Response of Common Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism, 8 J. COMP. POL. ANALYSIS 43-62
(2006).
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acts, and others, thrusted human rights protection into a predicament.
Most nation states enacted or expanded existing counterterrorism legisla-
tion to meet the challenges of terrorism. However, some of this counter-
terrorism legislation negates basic principles of international human
rights law.
These types of legislation have departed from the fundamental principles
underlying Western liberal democracies, such as the right to remain si-
lence, the right not to be tortured or subjected to other ill, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, the right to freedom of expression
and association and the right not to be detained except after a fair trial.102
In taking necessary steps to prevent terrorism after 9/11, state actors have
adopted torture as a strategy to obtain immediate intelligence concerning
terrorist attacks or terrorist networks through confessions. However, the
spirit of international conventions, as seen in the provisions of the Ge-
neva Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights, is
such that ‘torture’ and any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
is an aberration of international human rights law. The right not to be
tortured is absolute, unqualified and non-derogable. Pursuant to Article 4
of the ICCPR, “no derogation from article 7. . .may be made under this
provision.”103 Even though states adopt tactics of torture with the justifi-
cation that it is necessary because of the extreme dangers of terrorism,
international law firmly maintains an absolute ban on torture. State ten-
dency to adopt such policies are at odds with international law, which
expressly prohibits torture and characterizes it as a crime. Under interna-
tional law, it is immaterial whether there is an extreme state of emer-
gency in a nation. The right of freedom from torture and other forms of
ill-treatment is legally “absolute” so that no limitations may be placed on
the right under any circumstance. Indeed, Article 2(2) of the UNCAT
states: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”104 Thus, the law is
not subject to any exceptions and cannot be deviated from under any
circumstance, even for the enhancement of national security.105
102. Id.
103. ICCPR, supra note 9.
104. I. Turner, Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal Duty to Infringe Freedom
from Torture, 35 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 760-78 (2012).
105. L. Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International
Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 (2005).
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Undeniably, sovereign states have the exclusive right to use force to pro-
tect their national security.106 States, nevertheless, are bound by interna-
tional humanitarian law, which prohibits excessive and indiscriminate
use of force and reprisals. History is abound with abuses of individual
liberty, rights and security carried out by state actors under the ploy of
protecting national security. Unavoidable conflicts have arisen out of at-
tempts to balance the security demands between nation states and its citi-
zens, nations and sub-groups and national sovereignty and the global
community.107 As one scholar argued, there is a risk of nation states
coming down to the level of terrorist organizations if they fail to adhere
to the rules of international humanitarian law in their bid to enhance na-
tional security in the war against terror.108 Against the background of
human rights, it is essential that states and individuals adhere to funda-
mental legal principles established in important international treaties,
such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. It is legally incumbent on liberal democratic
countries, such as the United Kingdom, to uphold these rights even in the
event of serious emergencies. It must be recalled that while these interna-
tional treaties created room for derogation at the instance of any threat to
national security, such derogation must necessarily comply with the in-
ternational legal commitments of that nation. Subsequent to 9/11, this has
not been the case. The anti-terrorism laws of most liberal democracies
are inconsistent with their international legal commitments. Following
the 9/11 attacks, a whole raft of new arrangements and legislations have
been passed or foreshadowed in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada
and the United States.109 Measures implemented or seriously contem-
plated include indefinite detention without trial or judicial review, trial of
terrorists by military tribunal, removal of the right to silence and legal
representation, eavesdropping on lawyer-client communications, use of
torture and drugs to force confessions, increased surveillance and re-
duced privacy protections, and vastly expanded resources to those sec-
tions of the military and paramilitary police involved in ‘homeland’
security.110 For instance, under the Australia Security Intelligence Or-
ganization Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (ASIO), non-
suspects can be detained merely for the purpose of questioning and intel-
106. C. Gibbs, Securing the Nation: Radicalism and Security in 1790s Britain (Aug. 2013) (un-
published M.A. thesis, University of York) (on file with University of York Library system).
107. Id.
108. P. WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 125
(Frank Cass Publishers 2001).
109. J. McCulloch, War at Home: National Security Arrangements Post 11 September 2001, 27
ALTERNATIVE L. J. 87 (2002).
110. Id.
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ligence gathering, which is incompatible with Australia’s legal commit-
ment under the ICCPR to respect an individual’s civil and political
rights, including due process.111
With the current global war on terrorism, the existence of an interna-
tional body of law followed uniformly by states is all the more signifi-
cant. However, after the Cold War, and even more so after 9/11, the role
of international law has received a lot of scrutiny concerning its effec-
tiveness in being able to govern the conduct of states and non-state ac-
tors. A consideration of the roles of international law is integral to any
determination of its effectiveness.112 In analyzing  the effectiveness of
international law with respect to ‘international terrorism’ and ‘torture,’
this paper will endeavor to look into the role of international law in con-
trolling states by ‘inhibiting’ or ‘directing’ their conduct both in their
relations with other states and with the individuals of those states.113
International law has shifted away from a system predominantly con-
cerned with international cooperation amongst states to a system that is a
lot more engaged in the control of its subjects.114  Accordingly, the UN-
CAT is often publicly celebrated as one of the most successful interna-
tional human rights treaties. Nations that ratified the treaty consented to
not intentionally inflict “severe pain or suffering whether physical or
mental” on any person to obtain information or a confession, to punish
that person or to intimidate or coerce him or a third person.115 Article 17
of the ECHR further provides that:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the Convention.116
However, after 9/11, many of the suspects caught by the United States in
the course of the ‘war against terror’ have been turned over to Saudi,
Egyptian and Syrian officials who are all suspected of practicing tor-
111. Michaelsen, supra note 10.
112. It will be beyond the ambit of this paper to delve into all the roles of international law.
113. DIXON, supra note 4.
114. Id.
115. O. Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
116. ECHR, supra note 6.
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ture.117 It was also popularly known that the United States used ‘stress
and duress’ techniques that amounted to torture.118 It becomes not only a
moral challenge to impose order in the international arena, but also a
challenge to advocates of international law who believe in the effective-
ness of international law.
Considering the flagrant violations of the right not to be tortured under
international human rights law, one begins to ask the question: what has
gone wrong with international law for these violations to persist? Were
peculiar circumstances, such as international terrorism, not considered
before the laws prohibiting torture were enacted? Or do states that have
ratified the international treaties on torture not perceive international law
as ‘law’ sensu stricto? Whichever the reason, it must be clearly stated
that there cannot be international law without state actors. Nation states
can be described as the ‘web’ of international law. The effectiveness of
international law is, to a great extent, predicated upon the actions or com-
pliance of state actors. For instance, the offense of torture, ill, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is predominant in cases of arbitrary
detention such as secret detentions, enforced disappearance, extraordi-
nary rendition, which all take place within state jurisdictions. A careful
examination of Article 2 of the UNCAT reveals that it is incumbent on
nation states who are party to the Convention to take necessary steps,
such as legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures, to pre-
vent acts of torture in any territory within their jurisdiction. To this de-
gree, the onus of implementation of international human rights laws
concerning torture has shifted from the international plane to the national
orbit.
International law attaches great importance to the positive nature of the
anti-torture right obliging states to take steps to prevent harm to its citi-
zens.119 In Osman v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR further articulated the
duty of states when an applicant complained of the failure of authorities
to protect the right to life of her husband when he was threatened and
later killed by their son’s former teacher.120 The Court  pointed out that
state obligation connotes putting in place effective criminal law provi-
sions to deter the commission of offenses supported by law enforcement
machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of
such provisions.121 In implementing this requirement, the Former Yugo-
117. Hathaway, supra note 115.
118. Id.
119. Turner, supra note 104.
120. Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (2000).
121. Id. ¶ 115.
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slav Republic of Macedonia, one of the parties to the UNCAT, amended
Article 142 of its Criminal Code to make it consistent with Article 1 of
the UNCAT. Article 142 of the Criminal Code punishes acts of torture
with a prison term of three months to five years. Further, Article 143 of
the Criminal Code makes it an offense for a person acting in his official
capacity to mistreat, intimidate, insult or treat another in such a manner
that his or her human dignity or personality will be humiliated. The act of
preventing, suppressing and sanctioning breaches of freedom from tor-
ture through the inclusion of these types of provisions in the Criminal
Code can be seen as one of the ways through which states can prevent
the offense of torture.
However, the following question could be asked: how effective will the
provisions of these articles be in the prevention of torture when torture is
perpetrated by government or public agents? After 9/11, states commit
acts of torture with impunity. Without an effective justice system, con-
structive results from the enactment of such provisions in any criminal
code will only be a mirage. The positive duty of preventing acts of tor-
ture by states extends to taking affirmative steps to prevent ‘impunity’
for the sake of justice for victims. Preventing impunity may deter or sup-
press future acts of torture on suspects. For this reason, it becomes perti-
nent for states to maintain an effective and consistent justice system
where the rule of law is upheld and public confidence is guaranteed.122
Existing internationals laws that cover the prevention of torture are not
effectively upheld by state justice systems. For example, the Geneva
Convention expressly obligates state parties to the Convention to enact
domestic legislations essential for the prosecution of grave breaches of
the Convention, including the right not to be tortured. States are addition-
ally obligated to search for those accused of committing grave breaches
and to either prosecute them or turn them over to another state for
trial.123 Nevertheless, it is well established that after 9/11, many nation
states continue to be responsible for the offense of torture without conse-
quence. Failure to hold these erring states accountable is of great con-
cern. This concern gets more burdensome since the offense of torture
incubates itself in other offenses, such as arbitrary detention, enforced
disappearance, complicity and extrajudicial killing. As a result, the re-
sponsibility for these violations does not rest solely on one state, but also
extends to other states.
122. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 105 (2012).
123. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
21
Anwukah: Torture and Counterterrorism
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2016
22 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XXI
Article 12 of the UNCAT further enjoins state parties to conduct a
‘prompt and impartial’ investigation where they reasonably believe that
torture has been committed. These provisions are not discretionary. The
investigation into allegations of torture, as provided by the UNCAT, will
most definitely be carried out by the state or its agents. However, these
same state actors have also become complicit in acts of torture and are
guilty of the offense. Practically speaking, these provisions of interna-
tional conventions become illusory since acts of torture are often com-
mitted by the states that are expressly obligated through the rules of
international human rights law to comply with its jus cogens norms. Had
the offense of torture been committed by individuals in their personal
capacity, rather than as a government actor, the degree of compliance
with international laws against torture would be higher. The reasoning
behind this is that in that circumstance the enforcement of the law would
be by a superior over a subordinate. The situation becomes absolutely
cumbersome where the enforcement of a law is meant to be carried out
by the violator.
Additionally, under international human rights law, states are not permit-
ted to transfer individuals to countries where there is a real risk of torture
or ill treatment. Article 3 of the UNCAT prohibits states from expelling,
returning or extraditing individuals to another state where there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that there is a danger of being subjected to
torture. Both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also prohibit
such transfer. However, the rate at which states violate this law is as
though this rule never existed. For instance, in Khaled El-Masri v. United
States, the circumstances under which he was rendered to the CIA was
enough of a signal to the respondent state that he would be tortured. The
facts of that case also revealed an uncertainty as to whether the required
diplomatic assurance was ever obtained by the respondent state from the
CIA.124 Also, in Ahmed Agiza v. Sweden,125 the UN Committee on Tor-
ture found that Sweden committed extraordinary rendition in violation of
Article 3 of the UNCAT.126 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee
found in Muhammad Al-Zery v. Sweden127 that Sweden was also in vio-
lation of Article 7 of the ICCPR by expelling Al-Zery to Egypt despite
the real risk of torture there. The Committee found that Sweden could
124. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
125. Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, ¶¶ 2.1-2.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/
2003 (2005).
126. A. SINGH, GLOBALIZING TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDI-
TION (Open Society Found. 2013).
127. Al-Zery v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Nov. 2006).
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not demonstrate whether the diplomatic assurance obtained from Egypt
was able to guard the rendition victim against torture.128 Based on this, it
could be argued that states obtain diplomatic assurances not because of a
strict compliance with the non-derogatory right not to be tortured, but
only as a mere formality.
The effectiveness of international law, to a considerable extent, is depen-
dent upon some of the national policies or executive privileges of nation
states. For instance, some states who ratified the UNCAT invoke the
“state secrets privilege” when there is an allegation of torture against
them.129 Often times, this privilege violates international human rights
laws, such as Article 14 of the UNCAT. In 2007, the United States, for
example, invoked the states secret privilege in Khaled El-Masri v. United
States.130 In a lawsuit, the invocation of this privilege permits the gov-
ernment to bar the disclosure of any information where the disclosure
would cause harm to national security.131 Under the Bush administration,
this typically rare privilege has increasingly been used to dismiss entire
suits before they even commence.132 As a result, this concept hinders the
search for the truth and ultimately, suffocates the effectiveness of the law
as the rights of tortured victims to redress and remedy cannot be en-
forced. The main goal of international human rights law is, undoubtedly,
the protection of human rights. The anti-torture norm is often described
as having the status of jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international
relations from which no derogation is permissible. International human
rights law makes it categorically clear that, even in cases of war or public
emergency, torture and other ill or degrading treatment is prohibited. An
argument can be made that a victim’s sense of helplessness and struggles
suffered because of non-disclosure of the truth in their case and the de-
nial of his right to redress and remedy is, in itself, torture. Where, then, is
the ‘force’ of international human rights law in controlling the conduct of
states and inhibiting the violation of fundamental rights of individuals?
The interpretation and implementation of international human rights law
should be such that these laws will be made effective and practicable.
The practicability and effectiveness of these laws is not limited to the
128. SINGH, supra note 126.
129. AI International Secretariat, USA: Federal Court Rejects Governments Invocation of
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substantive provisions of international human rights law, but necessarily
extends to its procedural provisions as well.
To guarantee the effectiveness of international law, sometimes certain
provisions are included in the rules or body of international law to ensure
the firm compliance of state actors. The UNCAT states that the existence
of a state of war or public emergency does not provide justification for
its breach, with the exception of self-defense.133 For instance, pursuant to
Article 4 of the UNCAT, states are obliged to criminalize all acts of
torture. This provision serves as a tool to help ensure effectiveness. The
criminalization of torture at the national level creates the perception that
torture is an aberration.  It follows that a strict adherence to the right not
to be tortured at the national level will also play out at the international
level since the offense of torture is committed by state actors or agents.
However, this has not been the case and after 9/11, states have ignored
not only the principles of international human rights law, but also their
own national rules of criminal law. To this extent, can it still simply be
said that the institution of international law is not effective?
The question of effectiveness cannot be divorced from the issue of com-
pliance. Compliance refers to the degree to which state behavior inte-
grates with the prescription or proscription of an agreement. However,
the degree to which an agreement has an impact on state behavior
touches on its effectiveness.134 State compliance with the provisions of
international law, as stipulated in international conventions and treaties,
varies from the effectiveness of the provisions of the law itself. There-
fore, even if states do comply with international law, does international
law, as stipulated in conventions and treaties, meet the needs of the inter-
national community? Do the provisions of international law, in their
practical terms, deal effectively with the challenges in the international
orbit, such as the issue of international terrorism and the heinous viola-
tion of the right not to be tortured? Moreover, in the event of non-com-
pliance, does international law have an ‘effective’ means of enforcement
of its rules and principles which can compel future compliance?
IV. CONCLUSION
Historically, executive actions and court decisions lend credence to the
perception that national emergencies necessitate a sacrifice of civil liber-
133. J. GASKARTH, ENTANGLING ALLIANCES? THE U.K.’S COMPLICITY IN TORTURE IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2011).
134. J. von Stein, International Law: Understanding Compliance and Enforcement, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA (Denemark A. Robert ed., 2010).
24
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol21/iss1/4
2016] TORTURE AND COUNTERTERRORISM 25
ties and a bypass of certain rights.135 Texas Republican Lamar Smith
contended that the restriction of liberties in the face of a threat to national
security is something that has been practiced in free democracies “from
the golden age of Pericles in Athens to the World War 11.”136 The down-
ward adjustments of human rights have been justified by the outcry from
governments for national and international security after 9/11. Nation
states fight terrorism in defence of their proposition to make their politi-
cal life free from violence. Defeating terrorism, however, can necessitate
violence. It may also require coercion, deception, secrecy and the viola-
tion of human rights. It, therefore, becomes a puzzle as to how democra-
cies will have recourse to these means without obliterating the values for
which they stand.137
International terrorism and human rights are at a crossroads. The tragedy
of 9/11 sparked many questions about the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the state.138 Post 9/11, counterterrorism measures have tested
the tension that exists between these two areas. The issue of creating a
balance between national security and individual personal rights and
freedoms remains unresolved and controversial. Nation states have dif-
ferent degrees of security threats. In response to these threats, states en-
act laws and formulate policies that infringe upon the principles of
international human rights law. For the sake of security, unlawful acts,
such as detentions and torture, are rationalised139 and human rights are
impaired.
Accordingly, the formulation and implementation of counterterrorism
measures is one of the ways through which state compliance with inter-
national human rights laws and policies are tested. In the ‘war against
terror,’ the right not to be tortured is one that has been widely abused.
The systematic character of contemporary terrorism makes the practica-
bility of the absolute nature of the right not to be tortured vague. In prin-
ciple, nation states condemn the use of torture during interrogations of
terrorist suspects, but, practically, most of them have mixed records in
their efforts in the war against terrorism.140 Individuals in many countries
encourage strong implementation of security measures in response to do-
135. Adria Battaglia, The Rhetoric of Free Speech: Regulating Dissent Since 9/11 (May 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Texas Austin) (on file with author).
136. Id.
137. C. Moore, The World Spins Madly On: How The P5 Caused a Paradigm Shift in Norm
Diffusion, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 187 (2013).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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mestic terrorism threats despite the criticism of torture and inhuman
practices.141 For instance, it is public knowledge that the United States
declared that international law was to be no barrier to U.S. actions if its
national interests were at stake.142 Nevertheless, in considering the abso-
lute prohibition of torture, it is pertinent to recognise the fact that most of
the international treaties or domestic laws that prohibit torture absolutely
were enacted or ratified before the 9/11 attack. The ECHR, for example,
was entered into force in 1953.143 Although 9/11 did not usher terrorism
into the world, the mechanisms of the event plunged the world into a
historical dilemma.
Terrorism, as discussed, is an anathema that has destabilized national
security and to a large extent, the international community. Measures
have been adopted by nation states to counter this cankerworm of terror-
ism, which has eaten deep into the fabric of our societies. The adoption
and implementation of most of these counterterrorism measures have ad-
ded to the existing concerns about the effectiveness of international law.
It has been argued that the 9/11 incident changed the Western world. The
change was orchestrated not only by terrorism, but by counterterrorism
also.144 No doubt, the investigation into terrorist offenses presents acute
challenges to state actors. These include the risk of maltreating the inno-
cent.145 However, for a viable form of democracy and global security to
be maintained in practice, some fundamental values of international law
have to be respected unfailingly. Agreeably, international law is not a
perfect system of law, but at the same time, the flagrant violation of
human rights could have been worse in the absence of any international
human rights law. Therefore, in considering the effectiveness of interna-
tional law, it will be misleading to view its effectiveness in line with the
system of national law. There exist dichotomies between the two sys-
tems. For instance, national law is basically concerned with the legal
rights and duties of legal persons within a body politic.146 The law is
primarily derived from a legal superior (parliament or legislator) who is
seen as legally competent by the polity to which the law is addressed and
141. J. DAVIS ET AL., IN+TERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WAR, TORTURE AND TERRORISM: PER-
SPECTIVES OF TORTURE IN GREAT BRITAIN, NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED STATES, CANADA AND AUS-
TRALIA 551-63 (Springer New York 2013).
142. Id.
143. Aisha Gani, What is the European Convention on Human Rights?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/03/what-is-european-convention-on-human-rights-
echr.
144. C. LEWIS ET AL., COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE (Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd. 2007).
145. L. Arbour, In Our Name and on Our Behalf, 55 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 511 (2006).
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in circumstances where the governing power has both the authority and
practical capability to make and enforce the law.147 On the other hand,
international law is ceased with the rights and duties of states themselves.
On this plane, states are legal equals. There is no likelihood of legal
superiority in their relations with each other.148 Hence, the legal system
that will enhance the relations between these legal equals will be signifi-
cantly different from the legal system required for national law, which is
based more on exerting control over its citizens. These dichotomies pre-
sent international law as a system of law which is unique in and of itself.
V. RECOMMENDATION
One of the basic ingredients of torture, as highlighted by Article 1 of the
UNCAT, is the element of “deliberately inflicting pain or suffering for
the purpose of obtaining information or confession.” By implication,
there will not be a violation of the right not to be tortured if there is no
‘intention’ to ‘obtain information’ or ‘confession’ from an individual or a
third person. Therefore, with respect to the effectiveness of international
law in relation to the offense of torture, the right to remain silent should
be expressly integrated into the body of international human rights law,
irrespective of the fact that it is enshrined in most criminal law provi-
sions of nation states. Considering the fact that the principal intent of
torture is to obtain information, the express right to ‘remain silent’ be-
comes an integral component of the right not to be tortured. The right not
to be tortured and the right to remain silent could logically be described
as complementary rights. Complying with the right to remain silent will,
ultimately, enhance the respect of the right not to be tortured. Thus, the
right to remain silent should not be an implied right, but ought to be an
express right under international human rights law.
Although the right to ‘remain silent’ is not expressly stipulated under
international human rights law, the right to ‘fair trial,’ which is enshrined
in most international conventions, including Article 6 of the ECHR,
guarantees the procedural rights of parties in civil and criminal proceed-
ings. In essence, the right to ‘remain silent’ and the right not to incrimi-
nate oneself under Article 6(1) of the ECHR both prevent an interrogator
from obtaining information from a suspect or an accused by defying the
will of that suspect or  accused.149 Impliedly, an accused person or a
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. D. Vitkauskas & G. Dikov, Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial Under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE HUM. RTS. HANDBOOK 62-3 (2012), available at
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suspect has the right to remain silent and by law, should not be forced to
divulge any information or intelligence against his will. Therefore, in the
case of El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
presented earlier, the treatment the applicant was subjected to by the re-
spondent government and CIA agents lacked any ‘legal’ and ‘moral’ jus-
tification regardless of whether the applicant had crucial information
about a present of future terrorist threat against Macedonia. The appli-
cant had the legal right not to disclose the information and should not be
coerced to do so.
International law is an essential instrument, without which an interdepen-
dent world cannot function. International law facilitates the functioning
of the international community of which we all depend. Nevertheless,
considering the flagrant use of torture in the ‘war against terror’ by the
very states who are signatories to international treaties and conventions,
such as the UNCAT and the ECHR, could it be said that international
law is effective in countering terrorism in the war against terror? It is
incumbent on international human rights law to provide a framework
with set standards that must be complied with by nation states through
the collective medium of state responsibility and the rule of law.150 It is
pertinent the enhancement of its effectiveness that international law be
given urgent attention in the areas of enforcement and implementation of
its rules.
150. D. MOECKLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2014).
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